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Do Rational Choice Approaches have Problems?
MutCUItce
By analysing examples, this paper makes three points about rational choice approaches within socio-
logy. First, it is maintained that statistical techniques such as path diagrams and log-linear models are
more suited to rational choice approaches than is apparent from rational choice criticisms of empirical
social research. Secondly, it is held that the conditions under which the postulate that people act
rationally is applied are more important than this postulate itself, and that there should be a shift
from 'single decision, one good and two actors' to 'multiple decision, three actors and two goods'
auxiliary assumptions. Thirdly, it is argued that rational choice approaches pay insufficient attention
to the questions they should address and that the sociological tradition might furnish questions lead-
ing to exemplars which turn rational choice approaches into a progressive sociological paradigm.
Introduction
Recently I received a clipping from the Chronicle of
Higjm Education on the explanation of Nazi support
in Weimar Germany advanced by the sociologist
William Brustein. The expression 'rational choice
theorist' was underlined, and the coy question 'Arc
you?* was scribbled in the margin. I flushed.
The query and cut-out - sent by a senior US his-
torian to an apparently still green Dutch
sociologist — made me think about what is wrong
with sociology. It is not surprising that the press
associates an academic with some theory. But why
do some scholars identify themselves with one?
And why do sociologists who utilize a rational
choice approach, define it as so central a part of
their self-image? In the 1960s and 1970s there were
various types of Marxists around, and the more
these people identified themselves with theories
supposedly proposed by Marx, the better they were
at discounting evidence telling against these the-
ories. Is it too much to say that nowadays there are
quite a few true believers in the rational choice
approach? Theories are devised to answer questions;
they ought to be tested, they do not have to be dis-
carded as soon as they turn out to be wrong.
However, theories do have a record. In sociology it
is sometimes necessary to take stock.
I first address arguments holding that rational
choice approaches do not square with mainstream
research techniques. In my opinion these arguments
needlessly discount a prime possibility for testing
explanations. I then argue that current opposition
to the principle of rational choice is misguided.
The pertinent issue concerns the conditions under
which it is applied. It should not only be used
under the condition that markets prevail. It is also
to be applied by making a 'multiple decision, three
actors, two goods' auxiliary assumption. My main
point is that current rational choice explanations
pay insufficient attention to long-standing questions
and do not concentrate efforts on a limited set of
questions. By drift rather than design, rational
choice explanations deal more and more with the
social institutions featured in current sociology text-
books, and neglect the questions posed by
sociology^ founders.
Although I do not identify with one particular
rational choice approach, I think rebuttals are as
pathological as advocacies, and I agree with propo-
nents of rational choice approaches that sociology is
in a sorry state. Homans did not want to be asso-
ciated with any tradition except the tradition of
telling the truth. I am prepared to contribute to
O Oxford UnirOTity Pros 1996
 at R
adboud U
niversity on M
arch 13, 2015
http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
168 WOUTUITEE
every theoretical tradition in sociology having a
branch which is guided by a meta-tradition to
avoid the immunizat ion of theories against evi-
dence, which values hypotheses for their wealth of
information, and judges theories by the problems
they solve. My points are that rational choice
approaches unnecessarily devalue mainstream
empirical social research, pay little attention to inter-
esting auxiliary assumptions while predicting, and
would yield more progress by focusing on a few
long-standing problems rather than by addressing a
broad range of hand-picked questions.
Before going on, I wish to say that the expression
'rational choice theory ' is somewhat misleading.
First, it is no t a system of hypotheses. It is an
approach, or rather a family of approaches. There is
Beckeris economic approach, which seeks to prove
the existence of efficient equilibria. Then there is
Boudon's p rog ramme highlighting the possibility
that individual rationality does not result in a collec-
tive opt imum. O n e also encounters formal game
theory, for instance in the studies by Ullmann-
Margalit. In addi t ion, there are explanations
involving historical analysis, such as De Swaan%
work.
Secondly, it is unclear with which means rational
choice programmes arc to be executed. The applica-
tion of general hypotheses involves auxiliary
assumptions. Which ones are currently the most pro-
mising when applying the principle that people
choose rationally? Becker's approach docs not stand
out so much for the hypothesis that people act ration-
ally, but for the assumption that people act under the
condi t ion of the existence of markets. In effect, this
p rogramme maybe seen as an attempt to turn cultural
sociology and organizational sociology into market
sociology. However, Boudonfc rational choice
approach postulates a variety of interaction systems.
Thirdly, what exactly is to be approached with the
general hypothesis that people act rationally? The-
ories are there to answer questions. Which
questions arc to be tackled within a rational choice
approach?
Empirical Social Research Devalued?
If international sociology has a mainstream, it is
empirical social research. Rational choice advocates
have been quite negative about some of the statistical
techniques of this tradition and of at least one of its
substantive show-pieces. Boudon, Coleman, and
others arc quite right in holding that a causal
model does not amount to a theory. Perhaps the con-
crete hypotheses summarized into causal models can
be derived from more general ones, but within the
tradition of empirical social research all too often
the story behind these models remains untold.
Rational choice theorists like longer stories.
A lot of empirical social research seeks to explains
variance, and does so by adding factors to some
multivariate model. Boudon criticized such factor
explanations. It is easy to agree that a list of disparate
factors is decidedly less worthwhile than various pre-
dictions derived from one overarching principle like
that of rationally acting human beings. But how
much weight does this argument have against the
application of multivariate models?
A perusal of the literature falling within the tradi-
tion of empirical social research makes clear that
quite a few of the research questions do not amount
to explaining variance in one variable, but to
explaining the association between two variables.
In my opinion, the more of these questions, the
better. However, the explanation of empirical regu-
larities does not do away with multivariate models.
In that case, what should be considered is not so
much the percentage of explained variance in some
dependent variable, but the proportion of the asso-
ciation between two specific factors accounted for
after inserting into a bivariate model factors central
to the proposed explanation of this association. If it
is a rational choice explanation, these factors involve
the preferences of individuals and the resources they
command and barriers they face. My point is that a
focus on the proportion of explained association
makes Lazarsfeld's elaboration procedures for tabu-
lar analysis appropriate. Also pertinent is path
modelling, a type of multivariate linear regression.
But path models have been held to be less useful for
testing rational choice explanations. One instance is
Boudon% criticism of Duncanis path model of the
socio-economic life-cycle. Tb determine the force
of Boudon's criticism, let me recount the story
behind Duncan's model.
First-generation social mobility studies sought to
determine how much difference there is in social
mobility between industrial countries and the extent
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to which these differences are explained by the sur-
vival of feudal traditions, the nature of the party
wielding power over the state, and the pace of eco-
nomic development. Research of the second
generation — Duncan% path model of the socio-
economic life-cycle was its exemplar - postulated
that in agrarian societies the relation between
fatherls and son^ occupation largely results from
direct transmission. In industrial societies the rela-
tion between father^ and son's occupation is
weaker. This link itself was to be accounted for by
the effect of father^ occupation on son's education
(which weakened) and the bond between son's edu-
cation on occupation (which strengthened). With
modernity, there was a shift from ascription to
achievement in the socio-economic life-cycle of
individuals. A test of this hypothesis from the func-
tionalist approach within mainstream sociology
involves a comparison of at least two path models
of the socio-economic life-cycle. Duncan compared
four (Blau and Duncan, 1967:181).
Thus, status attainment models explain the posi-
tive association occurring in a certain country at a
certain time between father^ and sods occupation.
They do so by invoking education not simply as an
additional factor, but as a resource which at various
times is transferred in different degrees from father
to son and which is more powerful in some periods
than in others. Of course, the hypotheses about the
link between origin and education and between
education and occupation in their turn might be
explained. But an unqualified demand for explana-
tion results in an endless story. Models of the socio-
economic life-cycle terminate the explanation of a
regularity by invoking the material and cultural con-
straints faced by parents making educational
decisions for their children, and the choices employ-
ers make when selecting employees. Indeed, the
prevalence in industrial societies of achievement
values so often asserted by functionalism may be
viewed as the existence of laws stipulating freedoms
available to anyone, such as those of education,
enterprise, and residence, plus values shared by the
population supportive of these universal freedoms.
Path models stop explaining an empirical regularity
at a point congenial to rational choice programmes.
In the course of the second generation of mobility
research it gradually became clear that the shift from
a distributive process governed by particularist
ascriptive values to one guided by universalist
achievement values was at least not as fast as had
been predicted. New explanations were proposed
that explained these persistent inequalities. One
was advanced by Boudon. Schooling had expanded
rapidly in Western industrial nations in the period
after World War II, but social mobility had hardly
increased and was occurring to more or less the
same degree in most industrial societies. That is,
although according to models of the socio-
economic life-cycle the more highly schooled mem-
bers of a certain population have the better jobs, in
societies with a higher average level of schooling
social mobility was not more widespread. Boudon
(1973) held that regression models were inadequate
to capture the processes of reproduction occurring
in societies. To what extent is this a valid criticism?
Boudonls criticism of the model of status attain-
ment was not really that it did away with people
making choices. A model of status attainment
assumes that when explaining a person's level of edu-
cation, the auxiliary assumption of one choice
suffices: a big one-shot choice between each and
every institutionally possible level of education.
Boudon^ idea was that there are in an educational
system several points at which decisions whether or
not to continue studying are being taken, and that
the outcomes of these decisions combine to repre-
sent the variable 'finally attained level of education'.
In this way, small inequalities in the chances of con-
tinuation between the children from different social
background at the various branching points in a
schooling system result in large social inequalities
in the total level of schooling. According to Bou-
don, this process cannot be modelled by linear
regression techniques.
Mare (1980) addressed the question of explaining
the relation between social origins and final educa-
tion as the combined result of several decisions. He
found that stable odds ratios for persons from a
higher rather than a lower social origin for each
decision to stop or to continue studying, together
with educational expansion and more equal ratios
for later decisions, at the aggregate level logically
imply a weakening of the tie between sotial origins
and total years of schooling. The technique Mare
applied for modelling the various transitions was,
given the series of yes-no choices, logistic regres-
sion for each choice and linear regression for the
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combined outcome. Boudon left unclear whether
his remarks about techniques that do not accord
with modelling multiple decisions applied to all
kinds of regression techniques or only to linear
regression and path analysis. A test of Boudonls
explanation turned out to involve logistic regression
models.
Some years after Boudon's criticism of the socio-
economic life-cycle, research on social mobility
entered a third generation. For a long time those
working in this field had struggled with comple-
menting the total percentage of persons mobile in
a society from one stratum to another, with a mea-
sure that indicates how much circulation or
exchange there is between a society's strata. In the
second half of the 1970s this measure was found in
odds ratios and parameters from log-linear models.
Goldthorpe (1980:77) gave its most effective formu-
lation. The old question about circulation mobility
was to be rephrased as one about competitions: an
odds ratio can be interpreted as indicating the
degree of inequality in the outcome of a competi-
tion between persons from one rather than another
social origin for one rather than another destination.
Later it became clear that it was not only the compe-
titive outcomes that could be captured by log-linear
models for the interior cells of a mobility table. The
degree of (un)favourableness of structures in which
various competitions take place could also be repre-
sented by log-linear parameters, in this case for the
marginals of square tables. One example of such a
structure is the number of higher positions available
in a labour market compared with the number of
persons from higher origins. Another pertains to
marriage markets and the number of men with uni-
versity education marrying in a certain year relative
to the number of women with that level of education
who do so.
The difficulty of devising measures for competi-
tive outcomes before the onset of the third
generation of mobility studies was often phrased as
the need to eliminate structurally enforced mobility
from total mobility, with the structures forcing
mobility being represented by the marginab of a
mobility table. This second generation formulation
was criticized by Coleman (1987). Coleman main-
tained that an approach assuming that the choices
of individuals are constrained by structures does
not eliminate their effects. Rather, it determines
their influence upon the choices of individuals.
This criticism holds that path models of the socio-
economic life-cycle are not suited to the explanation
to be tested. Because these models involve the com-
putation of standardized regression coefficients,
they do away with structures. They should incorpo-
rate the effects of structures.
Coleman's criticism against standardized linear
regression is powerful. However, it makes unstan-
dardized linear regression more attractive: the
intercept of an equation regressing sonis unstandard-
ized occupation on father^ unstandardized
occupation represents structural mobility
(McClendon, 1977). But how do Coleman's argu-
ments affect log-linear models? To begin with,
mobility purged of marginal effects may itself be
seen as an aspect of societyis structure. Following
Blau (1977), a structure is not only made up of a dis-
tribution. It also involves the relation between a
person^ place in one distribution and that person's
place in another distribution. Secondly, log-linear
models are able to capture the extent of discrepan-
cies between marginal distributions. Thirdly, some
hypotheses about structural effects lack substance.
The hypothesis that women at a marriageable age
from cohorts with a sex ratio that is unfavourable
to them are more likely to remain unmarried or to
marry older men is tautologous. Finally, models
with parameters pertaining to competitions
between people differing in resources are quite well
suited to theories that assume that people act ration-
ally and under the constraints of markets.
Coleman voiced another criticism of models of
the socio-economic life-cycle. He is concerned
with the issue of how to answer macro-questions
by micro-hypotheses, and regards Duncan's models
as one instance where it was ducked. To make his
argument, Coleman made a diagram consisting of
four dots connected by lines, with the lower hori-
zontal line standing for a relation between -two
individual variables and the upper one for a relation
between two macro-variables. According to
Coleman, Duncan^ story about the socio-economic
life-cycle leaves the line going down from the
macro-level to one individual variable unspecified,
as well as the line going up from the individual vari-
able to the macro-level.
Is this really so? The bond between the social
origin of persons and their social destination is not
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only an individual relation. It is also a characteristic
at the macro-level. Of course, one model of the
socio-economic life-cycle does not yield a macro-
variable. But then, Duncan made models for four
cohorts of US males. An odds ratio or a log-linear
parameter aggregates individual data into measures
of the unequal outcomes of competitions between
individuals. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992)
compared such measures for a dozen countries.
Mobility studies explain the strength of the rela-
tion between father^ and sonis occupation occurring
in a society at various points in time. Thus, the lower
horizontal line in Coleman^ diagram can be viewed
not only as an individual relation, but also as a
macro-phenomenon. Coleman s^ diagram does not
help in making this Gcstalt switch. The diagram is
misleading because it involves only one model of
the socio-economic life-cycle. It must be added
that structural effects can be estimated by incorpor-
ating variables for them (for instance the average
level of education attained in various cohorts) into
linear and logistic regression equations. In the past
few years multi-level modelling has blossomed. If,
for instance, a linear regression model includes an
effect of a structural variable on the slope of the
regression of fatherls occupation on son^ s occupa-
tion, macro is linked to micro and micro to macro.
'Do People Behave Rationally or is their
Behaviour Guided by Norms?' and Other
False Questions
In sociology it is accepted that theories should be
multi-layered (Homans, 1967; Lenski, 1988): a
hypothesis explaining an empirical regularity can,
in its turn, be explained by a higher-level one.
When applying this stipulation, the question arises
of how far one should press explanations and what
the highest level looks like. It has been held for a
long time that sociology should explain regularities
pertaining to societies, but that their explanation
should refer to individuals. More recently it has
been held that explanations should involve the
assumption that individuals act rationally. In fact, a
rational choice approach is stricter than methodolo-
gical individualism. Indeed, Becker^ approach is
even stricter - on two counts.
The argument that (rational) individual explana-
tions amount to higher-level explanations is
convincing as a logical exercise. However, it has to
be pointed out that higher levels of generality can
be obtained not only by moving from the macro-
to the micro-level, but also from more specific phe-
nomena on the macro-level to more abstract
phenomena on that level. The example of Lensktfs
ecological evolutionism suggests that both move-
ments are present in elaborate answers to macro-
sociological questions (Lenski, 1966; Lenski et a/.,
1995; cf. Ultee et al., 1992). Thus, the question of
whether progress is to be made by going after
higher-level explanations on the micro- rather than
on the macro-level, is a loaded one.
The case in favour of higher-level explanations in
the social sciences has been argued most succinctly
by Malewski (1967). It is worthwhile to develop a
higher-level explanation because it corrects a lower-
level one or an empirical regularity. It does so by
indicating conditions under which the lower-level
explanation does not hold or the empirical regular-
ity does not obtain. The logic of this argument is
faultless; its force is unknown. As a logical argument
it does not and cannot say how often these condi-
tions occur.
Wippler (1983) derived conditions under which
Michels's iron law of oligarchy does not hold: a
trend towards oligarchy in a voluntary organization
is not irreversible, but depends on conditions that
may not always obtain. One of them is the existence
of other voluntary organizations catering to the same
needs of the same persons. When an organization^
leaders do not respond to rank and file pressure, its
members may not only become inactive because voi-
cing one's opinion goes unrewarded, but may quit
and form a new organization. That is certainly possi-
ble. But quite probably the costs of starting a new
organization are higher than the costs of raising
oneis voice within the old one. And the rewards of
the new organization are only potential and distant.
So, how often will dissatisfied members quit an orga-
nization to start a new one? The question of the
conditions under which an empirical regularity or a
lower-level explanation holds is not very relevant. A
distinction has to be made between more and less fre-
quently occurring conditions.
In recent debates on what exactly the highest level
of explanation should be like, the principle of rational
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choice has been contrasted with the principle of
norm-guided behaviour.This occurred in exchanges
on Dahrendorf^ bomo xciologkus and Becker's homo eco-
nonricus, and in empirical studies explaining specific
empirical regularities. Friedman (1983) tests norma-
tive explanations of religious specialization in
academia against rational explanations. According
to Heath etal. (1991) in the field of voting behaviour
there are economic and social explanations.
In my opinion, this debate presents a false dicho-
tomy. If contrasts are to be made, it is between the
assumption that the actions of individuals take
place within markets and the assumption that they
take place under other conditions. According to
Heilbroner (1953), the discovery of classical econo-
mics was not that of a rational human being. Its
contribution was the hypothesis that under the con-
dition of markets self-interest leads to a greater
improvement in general welfare than under the con-
dition of organizations and traditions. Markets,
organizations, and traditions are co-ordinating
mechanisms. In markets, behaviour beneficial to
the commonwealth is elicited by the lure of higher
profits, wages, and rents. In organizations dysfunc-
tional behaviour is warded off by the threat of
physical sanctions. Networks make people follow
traditions by admiration and humiliation. But
under all three conditions human behaviour is self-
interested and rational.
Becker's predictions only apply in those cases
where markets prevail: 'The economic approach
has been refined during the past two hundred
years. It now assumes that individuals maximize
their utility from basic preferences that do not
change rapidly over time, and that the behaviour of
different individuals is coordinated by explicit or
implicit markets' (Becker, 1981: ix). Compared with
the stipulation that social phenomena should be
explained by the rationality of actors, Becker makes
two additional demands on highest-level explana-
tions. First, they should not assume that
preferences change (nor that they differ between
individuals (Stigler and Becker, 1977)); they invoke
at most differences in the resources people com-
mand and the barriers people face. That is why the
label 'constrained choice approach' is more appropri-
ate than 'rational choice approach! Secondly, the
only interaction system referred to in an explanation
should be of the market type.
Many a sociological criticism of the economic
approach has been directed against the assumption
f utility maximization. Berger (1992) pleaded in
favour of Pareto^ thesis of non-logical behaviour.
However, the assumption that people act irrationally
does not lead to definite predictions. In this sense, a
rational choice approach is simply a rational choice.
The contemporary issue of the yield of a full ration-
ality approach versus a limited rationality approach
will be left untouched here. In my opinion, experi-
mental psychology does not yet allow for
substituting one postulate for another.
A second criticism of Beckerls economic
approach is directed at its auxiliary assumptions on
preferences. Van Praag and Kapteynls (1973) evidence
in favour of reference drift and habit formation is
quite convincing. Their hypotheses arc also quite
useful because the arguments of rational choice
proponents are often directed against xheadboe char-
acter of many studies postulating changing or
differing preferences. This argument certainly does
not apply to Van Praag and Kaptcyn^ hypotheses.
What is more, the criticism of that they are ad hoc
might apply to assumptions about resources: it
undoubtedly applies to Bourdieuis (1987) assump-
tions on various forms of capital.
Thirdly, it is not dear why an economic approach
should assume the omnipresence of markets. Cer-
tainly, the commands of an organization are often
disobeyed, and in certain cases no commands exist.
In addition, not everything is ritualized, and tradi-
tions can vary in the extent to which people live up to
them. But then, each freedom of the market is not
invoked by everyone, and societies vary in the extent
to which people have the right to do whatever they
like. In addition, a model of the whip of authority
seems as simple as a model of the lure of market
gains, and so does a model of the strait-jacket of tra-
dition.
Finally, Becker's auxiliary assumption of the pre-
ponderance of markets clashes with the thrust of the
sociological tradition. Weber^ and Durkheims stu-
dies exemplify the crudeness of the assumption
that markets prevail for the study of contemporary
societies and its unsuitability for the study of long-
term social changes, a prime topic for macro-socio-
logical research. It even is doubtful whether the
assumption of a shift in co-ordinating mechanisms
from organizations and traditions to markets is
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accurate enough to get a grip on long-standing
questions. As first Weber, and later Elias, made
clear, the rise of the West is seen not only in the
advent of markets, but also in the rise of one specific
type of organi2ation. That organization possesses a
near-monopoly on the means of violence and is
called the state. As Coleman (1982) implied, for the
study of contemporary societies the notion of an
actor should be expanded so as to include corporate
actors. In addition, empirical social research on con-
sumer choice in contemporary Western societies
undertaken by Lazarsfeld and his pupils has shown
the effects of traditions enforced within networks. It
has led to Colcmanls (1988) hypothesis that social
capital contributes to the creation of human capital.
Of course, currently there are varieties of rational
choice approaches which are more liberal than
Becker's approach to the issue of the conditions
under which the principle of rational human beings
is to be applied. One of them is Boudonls pro-
gramme. It contains the assumption that human
behaviour is constrained by interaction systems,
and two types of such systems are distinguished:
functional systems and systems of interdependence.
These systems are not clearly delineated. However, it
is obvious that Boudorfs functional systems, in
which individuals play roles, arc traditional or orga-
nizational, and that systems of interdependence,
from which roles are absent, are akin to markets. It
is also clear that Boudon has hypotheses on markets
that are different from Beckerls. In Boudonls markets
the number of persons with higher levels of educa-
tion may be persistently higher than the number of
jobs requiring these levels. Under such circum-
stances, rational employers will choose not only on
the basis of education, but also on the basis of social
origins. This makes for a reproductive process pre-
cisely because of educational growth.
The difficulty for more liberal rational choice pro-
grammes is exactly their libertarianism. The rule to
apply the auxiliary assumption of the existence of
markets, organizations, or traditions as seems fit,
makes iotadboc theorizing. The injunction to depart
from an interplay of rights, duties, and prohibitions,
does not help much either. In fact in the current
situation of theorizing, the choice between market,
organization, and tradition is not the most pressing
one. I have already referred to Boudon's rule when
formulating auxiliary assumptions, to view a
seemingly one-shot choice as a multiple decision.
Another rule says that the explanation of a phenom-
enon is furthered by assuming that people do not
strive after one good, but after several. I will discuss
this rule in the next section. A third rule, which
holds that the common auxiliary assumption of
two actors should be replaced by an assumption of
three actors, will be elucidated now. I thus maintain
that the highest-level principle that people act
rationally should not be applied under a'single deci-
sion, one good, and two actors' auxiliary
assumption, but under a 'multiple decision, three
actors, and two goods' assumption.
Let me compare Beckers (1968) explanation of
crime with Merton% (1938) anomie theory. In the
economic explanation of crime, a certain form of
behaviour with a certain probability meets a pun-
ishment of some severity. People will perform this
behaviour when its yield surpasses the probability
of punishment multiplied by the severity of pun-
ishment. There are well-known exceptions to this
explanation. How are they to be explained? In my
opinion it should be recognized that the eco-
nomic explanation is a two-actor explanation.
The explanation is a two-actor one because there
is a natural person who will or will not trespass
the law, and a corporate actor who punishes viola-
tions of the law with a certain probability and
severity.
Merton seeks to account for the rinding that
throughout the past decades relatively more persons
committed crimes in the United States than in some
European countries. Mertons story is not that crime
is punished less severely or less frequently in the
United States. One novel feature of Merton^ theory
of anomie is that it invokes a third actor: a general
public that shuns people who do not pursue material
benefit and applauds those who succeed. In that case
there is a social incentive for a person lacking the
legitimate means necessary for obtaining material
goods, to use illegitimate means. The fruits of
crime are applauded more in the United States than
in Europe.
Of course, Mertons three-actor explanation has
not fared that well in empirical research. But anyone
interested in advancing a rational choice approach to
phenomena other than crime should consider that
two-actor explanations might be improved by
three-actor ones. Promising explanations invoke
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several kinds of actors using different types of
sanctions.
Rational Choice Questions and
Sociology's Questions
What exactly is to be approached within a rational
choice framework? Theories are there to answer
questions and to solve problems. We need to explore
which problems have been targeted by rational
choice approaches. Questions like those of
Ullmann-Margalit (1977) on the emergence of
norms are derivative - just like questions on the
emergence of markets. What are the prime problems?
Nowadays it is generally accepted that sociology
does not have a core of questions all its own. Accord-
ing to Berger (1992), sociology does not have a
subject, only an approach. According to Gove
(1995), sociologists are concerned with a heteroge-
nous list of topics, and Davis (1994) agrees.
Boudon (1979) also holds that sociology cannot be
defined by listing its questions. Such opinions
make it easy to make inroads into sociology. Each
rational choice programme is given a freedom to
pick questions. Arc easy questions being addressed
or long-standing ones?
Friedman and Hechter (1988) list macro-socio-
logical questions to which a rational choice
approach might fruitfully be applied. On two
counts, their list is not persuasive. First, the more
interesting questions from a formal point of view
are those that pinpoint a contradiction between
some empirical finding and some hypothesis. At
least, this is the first rule of the rational choice
approach taken by Boudon (1979; see also Popper,
1962). Now it is known that rational choice
approaches face anomalies. Some of them are men-
tioned by Friedman and Hechter, but the way they
might be digested is spelled out less fully than the
way a rational choice approach might deal with
anomalies for other approaches. Secondly, it does
not really do to point towards anomalies for other
approaches that might be resolved within a rational
choice approach. Listing such anomalies is like fish-
ing in a rich pond. How many anomalies still float
around freely?
In recent years the application of programmes of
rational choice to sociological questions seems to
have been following the definition of sociology in
American textbooks. This stipulation holds that
sociology is concerned with societies, and that
societies consist of various institutions. One such
institution is the economy, and various aspects of it
have already been covered by a rational choice
approach in the form of neoclassical economics.
Another institution is the polity, and, since Schump-
eter and Downs, at least some social scientists
concerned with politics have used a rational choice
framework. Then there is the judiciary as an institu-
tion. Here work within criminology following
Beccario and Bentham is relevant This leaves sociol-
ogy as dealing with the family and religion as
institutions.
What does the new household economics seek to
explain about the family? Becker (1981: ix) says:'This
book contains an economic approach to the family,
not in the sense of an emphasis on the material
aspects of family life, but in the sense of a particular
theoretical framework for analyzing many aspects of
family life.' These aspects turn out to be marriage,
birth, divorce, and the division of labour within
households. However, explaining aspects is not the
same as raising questions about empirical regulari-
ties. It is often unclear exactly which empirical
regularity occurring somewhere sometimes is to be
explained. Whereas Boudonls programme held that
sociology should explain social phenomena that are
puzzling given simple applications of the principle
that human beings act rationally, Beckerls approach
does not seem to follow such a rule for picking ques-
tions. At a time when the tendency for married
women to work outside the home was increasing,
this approach made it plausible that people married
to each other and maximizing their utility, would
work out some division of labour. Assortative mar-
riage is a well-known regularity. Becker predicts
complementarity rather than similarity, and says
that sociologists have not done empirical research
on his kind of complementarity.
Thus my criticism is not that current economic
explanations are wanting; it is that they deal with
the less interesting questions. Goode (1974)
remarked that the possibility that some men profit
from having several wives does not explain why
polygyny occurs in some places and not in others,
especially if we know that if polygyny is allowed
one man typically takes one woman: "Why are such
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systems approved and viewed as an ideal, though
few can attain it?* It may also be asked to what extent
questions about the family may be turned into
questions about the effects of behaviour taking
place within markets. To what extent is the expres-
sion 'marriage market' more than a metaphor? In
contrast to Becker, Coleman (1987) has dealt with
marriage squee2es. Apparently strong inelasticities
occur in marriage markets. What effects do such
competitive structures have on the extent of assorta-
tive marriage occurring in societies? These
arguments generate more questions than those on
the effects of the existence of marriage markets for
efficient equilibria. And perhaps these other ques-
tions are more interesting because they are
concerned with societal cohesion as indicated, for
instance, by non-assortative marriages.
Stark's rational choice explanations of religious
phenomena explicitly seek to account for phenom-
ena pinned down to a particular place and time. If
religion offers rewards like care for the sick, new reli-
gions should arise in times of large epidemics.
According to StarWs (1992) analysis of early Chris-
tianity, this is the case. But why does this rational
choice explanation of religion lead to a question
about the rise of Christianity? The question of
whether Christianity arose in times of epidemic
seems a logically easy choice - and one not condu-
cive to strong empirical tests. Stark* specific
application of rational choice principles says that
religion is to be explained by starting from epi-
demics. Thus the question is not: "Did the rise of
religion X take place in times of some epidemic?'
The question implied by the argument is: Did epi-
demic X prompt a new religion which offered more
support in times of illness than existing ones?" If that
is the case, there is no necessity to go back to diseases
in other countries in far away times when there is
AIDS in the USA today. In addition, as far as com-
mon knowledge of the religious consequences of
the medieval plague goes, this disease gave rise not
so much to a new religion as to hatred against Jews.
What kind of support does this offer to the sick?
Another of Stark's explanations does deal with a
long-standing and interesting question. According
to Nisbet^ (1966) rendition of the sociological tradi-
tion, the industrial and democratic revolutions
would effect a change from the sacred to the profane.
However as research shows, in the USA - the most
economically developed country in the world and a
country with strongly developed democratic institu-
tions - secularization, as measured by a low
frequency of church-going and a low percentage of
people believing in God, is quite weak and barely
increasing. Why is there so little secularization in
the USA? According to Stark and Iannacconc
(1994), competition between the various religions is
much stronger in the USA than in Europe, with its
history of state churches. This competition would
improve the goods on offer, and increase church
attendance and belief in God.
However, StarkTs specification of this question by
a rational choice perspective remains somewhat
unsatisfactory. The hypothesis of industrialism and
secularization is not to be rejected outright, but has
to be included in and conditioned by an overarching
explanation. The sociological tradition holds that
secularization increases because religious institu-
tions not only offer salvation hereafter but also give
support in times of illness, with disease in industrial
societies being viewed as to a large extent under
human control through medicine. With respect to
the provision of health, in contemporary societies
preachers compete not only with one another, but
also with doctors. Do churches in Europe get more
competition from hospitals than churches in the
USA, for instance, because European states provide
to a larger extent for the health of their citizens? I
would suggest that novel applications of the princi-
ple of rational choice to religious institutions assume
that churches deliver salvation plus some less
obvious good, and that bringing in the latter good
increases the number of suppliers by postulating a
new type of competitor. By consequently applying
a two-goods rule, rational choice questions become
more imaginative.
At present, rational choice programmes are
beginning to address long-standing and original
questions about families and religions. If they are
to make progress they also have to deal with the
large questions raised by the founders of sociology.
When reviewing them, it turns out that they com-
prise several smaller questions under one heading
(Ultee, 1991). For that reason I hold that-contrary to
various recent pronouncements — sociology has
central problems: problems of rationalization
(Weber), of inequalities (Marx), and of societal cohe-
sion (Durkhcim). These questions are to be
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understood as questions which, at least in days gone
by, were not adequately addressed by economics.
Adam Smith, the founder of economics, focused
on the wealth of nations. Weber held that the wealth
of Western nations could not be fully explained by
the formation of markets, that is by the emergence of
the rights to free enterprise and free labour. These
rules provide people with opportunities, but these
will not be used unless there is a motivation to use
them. According to Weber, at first people did not use
these rights because they were lured by higher
profits and wages. They pursued another goal. If
God placed them on earth to honour Him not only
in their prayers but also in their labour, they should
not be content with what they had, but should seek
to improve their station in life. Since Protestants
invented this world-view, Protestants used the free-
doms of enterprise and labour more than Catholics
did.
Following Weber, classical economics did not
raise the question of whether there were other moti-
vations than a higher standard of living which make
people use their legal economic rights and increase
the wealth of nations. Nor does contemporary insti-
tutional economics often do so. North and Thomas
(1973) argued that the emergence of intellectual
property rights was more important in the rise of
the West than the emergence of other freedoms.
Their study simply avoided the question of whether
different kinds of people are equally likely to use
these rights. Let me add that the sociological tradi-
tion does not require yet another study on the
difference between Protestantism and Catholicism.
The question rational choice approaches have to
deal with is that of whether all inhabitants of a
society are equally motivated to use their economic
rights.
Weber held that the rise of the West relied not only
on the advent of markets, but also on the rise of
bureaucracies, regarding both as instances of ration-
alization processes. Here the sociological tradition
must be faulted for postulating the formal state with-
out explaining its rise. What is more, De Swaan's
historically inclined rational choice approach is to
be praised for improving upon Weber* articulation
of the problem of the state. Following Weber, the
state has the legitimate monopoly on violence and
taxation. So what are taxes being spent on? Only
on armies, courts, the police, and prisons? Certainly
not. De Swaan (1988) combined the assumption that
armies, courts, the police, and prisons are collective
goods for the inhabitants of a country, and the
hypothesis of welfare economics that states limit
externalities, into a research programme.
De Swaarfs programme is guided by an overarch-
ing problem comprising various sub-questions.
Viewing a persons poverty, illiteracy, illness, and
unemployment as phenomena which have negative
external effects for the other inhabitants of a state,
De Swaan broke the problem of the provision of
collective goods in general down into that of
explaining how municipalities, provinces, and states
came to erect workhouses, to build schools and
make attendance compulsory, to counter epidemics
with piped water and sewerage, and to insure people
against the vagaries of the labour market. By bring-
ing in welfare economics, De Swaan improved upon
Webers problem of bureaucracy.
Smith held that the advent of the market improves
almost everyone* standard of living. The Marxist
programme in sociology, following the leads pro-
vided by Ferguson and Ricardo, raised the question
of inequality: the standard of living of the well-off
might be increased more by the rise of markets than
the standard of living of the truly disadvantaged. In
addition, sociology, more than economics, regards
the problem of income disparities as only one sub-
problem of an overarching problem of inequality. If
a country? income distribution remains the same,
this does not mean that all inhabitants stay put.
One specific degree of income inequality is compa-
tible with various amounts of mobility by
individuals from one income category to another.
Social mobility is a long-standing question in
sociology, and less unequal outcomes of competi-
tions between persons from higher rather than
lower origins for higher rather than lower destina-
tions decrease long-run inequalities. With its
interest in questions of assortative marriage, sociol-
ogy also studies another sub-question of the
inequality problem. If random mating occurs in a
country where both spouses have incomes, inequal-
ity between households will be smaller than in a
society where like marries like.
Of course, contemporary neoclassical economics
attempts to explain disparities in a country^ per-
sonal income distribution. Interestingly, such
theories as those of Thurow on job rather than
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wage competition and Lindbeck on insiders and
outsiders, have not gained the approval furnished
by the label 'rational choice approach! They do not
assume markets, but study the effects of other regu-
lations. Beckerls chapters on intergenerational
mobility and assortative marriage arc best under-
stood as admitting that these phenomena arc to be
explained by an empirically successful economic
approach.
Societal cohesion is sociology^ third major pro-
blem. Following Hobbcs, the founder of the
utilitarian tradition of which rational choice
approaches are an offshoot, the war of all against all
indicates the absence of societal cohesion. This is
true but obvious. Durkheim maintained that the
problem of cohesion was more general than that of
strife and peace, and his formulation of the problem
of societal cohesion also embraced less obvious
indicators, such as weak social bonds, with suicide
as an extreme case. In fact, Durkheim held that if
markets make for the greatest happiness of the great-
est number, suicide in France should have decreased
during the nineteenth century. In fact, it increased.
According to Durkheim the suicide rate rose
because the emergence of markets by definition
amounts to the disappearance of intermediary
groups, and because integration in intermediary
groups lowers the chances of suicide.
Since Hamermesh and Soss% (1974) economic the-
ory of suicide, rational choice approaches have not
contributed much to solving this less obvious part
of the problem of societal cohesion. In fact, the
question this theory sought to answer was not
about well-known regularities in suicide statistics
at all. Hechter faced the problem of cohesion, or
rather solidarity, head on. Although the problem of
cohesion has been divided within the sociological
tradition into various sub-questions, Hechter (1987:
19) surprisingly maintains that it is difficult to find
convincing indicators of solidarity. Hobbes would
have said that a society displays more solidarity if
the murder rate is lower, and Durkheim if the sui-
cide rate is lower. Hechter settles for the average
proportion of a personls private resources contribu-
ted to collective ends. These resources are not only
money (the amount of money spent on a Christmas
present for a spouse), but also time (the proportion
of faculty members attending a funeral service for a
deceased faculty member). It remains unclear why
Hechter does not invoke the language people use
when speaking about others: they may use kind
words or utter abuse. It certainly is possible to regard
language as the resource characteristic of human
beings. My point here is that, in defining solidarity
in this way, Hechter seems to ignore such pertinent
questions as the extent to which time spent on drink-
ing coffee with friends makes for more support in
times of illness, how far charity reduces the threat
to public safety from itinerant beggars, and whether
parental explanations rather than dictates lower the
probability that children hurt others. The specific
sub-questions of the problem of cohesion as posed
within the sociological tradition have disappeared
behind the horizon.
So let me sum up by challenging proponents of a
rational choice approach to take the main questions
of the sociological tradition and their sub-questions
seriously. Of course, this tradition does not offer a
list of neat research questions. But it does point
towards certain types of interesting questions. And
it might lend more coherence to a programme that
deals with so many loosely related questions that it
says something about nearly everything while mak-
ing progress with almost nothing.
Conclusion
Lcnski (1966: 40-1), when addressing the question
of inequality, stated:
unlike the classical economists we cannot limit our-
selves to those exchanges which are legal, ethical
and peaceable. We must concern ourselves with
both the legal and illegal, the ethical and the
unethical, the peaceable and the violent Were we
to limit ourselves to those exchanges which are
legal, ethical and peaceable, we should arrive at
quite a misleading answer to the question of who
gets what and why. . . . That is why the classical
economists have managed to shed so little light on
the question of who gets what and why, despite the
fact that they have written voluminously on the
subject of distribution.
Does a statement like this apply to the same extent to
rational choice approaches within contemporary
sociology?
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Of course, the conclusion of a paper is no place to
provide a full answer to such a broad question. But as
my argument has indicated, there are grounds for
pessimism. So let me finish on an upbeat note with
three signs of hope. First, current techniques of
statistical analysis are more attuned to rational
choice explanations than has been supposed.
Secondly, if progress is to be made in deriving
novel predictions from the assumption that people
act rationally, this principle should not only be
applied under a 'single decision, one good, two
actors'auxiliary assumption. Auxiliary assumptions
should also invoke a 'multiple decision, three actors,
and two goods'assumption. Thirdly, rational choice
approaches are in need of exemplars for puzzle-
solving. The sociological tradition might furnish
interesting questions leading to persuasive
exemplars.
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